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IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE CASE OF ZAIRE
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ABSTRACT Agriculture remains the principal component of economic development in
most African countries. Consequently, it is absurd to think of development without an
adequate agricultural policy as it is the case today.
An adequate strategy of agricultural development in Zaire necessitates the analysis of the
causes of current agrarian crisis and. in particular, the understanding of how the additional
agricultural output generated by the peasant community is monopolized by the commercial
bourgeoisie. Expansion of the agricultural production (not only cash crops but also food
production) should bring economical gains both to the state. the commercial bourgeoisie
and to the peasants. Nevertheless. the state and the commercial bourgeoisie do not dare to
see this fact.
Furthermore. agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa presents many common features and
faces similar difficulties. The analysis of the Zairian agriculture constitutes. then, a case
study.
Key Words: Peasants' agriculture; Agricultural crisis; National bourgeoisie; Sub-Saharan
Africa; Zaire.
INTRODUCTION
Most African countries have been confronted these past years with a serious
economic crisis characterized by heavy external debt which represented 50.63 %of
Gross Domestic Product (GOP) in 1982 (Christensen & Wituchi. 1986). low produc-
tivity, especially in agriculture, and increasing poverty among both rural and urban
populations.
In the meantime. the minority ruling class (political and commercial bourgeoisie) in
pmver has almost confiscated the state apparatus to realize its personal interests and
\vealth accumulation.
Thus. most observers interested in Africa's evolution remain very sceptical about
the economic development of this continent. Development is a difficult concept.
especially relating to the situation of Third World countries and many contradictory
definitions have been given about it.
Some Western scientists have considered development as a stage of human society
characterized by high industrialization. sustained economic growth, abundance of
goods and services (Rostow. 1963: Samuelson. 1972). This conception has raised
severe criticisms. Schumacher (1974: 171) has noticed that "economic develop-
ment is something much wider and deeper than economics. let alone econometrics.
Its roots lie outside the economic sphere. in education. organization. discipline and.
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beyond that, in political independence and a national consciousness of self-reliance".
Marxist scientists have centred their analysis on the theory of dependence and
exploitation of the periphery for the benefit of the international capitalism. so-called
centre (Samir. 1973: Frank. 1971). Dimensions of dependence and domination which
characterise political and economic relations between advanced and developing
countries cannot be excluded from the explanation of the underdevelopment process.
However. it will be a paralysing analysis if we cannot flnd out practical solutions
to overcome underdevelopment structures. Then. I think that it is not sufficient to
limit our investigations to the level of simple ascertainment of dependence or ex-
ploitation.
Consequently. economic development is considered, in this paper. as human beings'
capability to participate actively in the national economy and to share equitably the
national product. Agricultural development means. then. the possibility for peasants
to increase steadily the agricultural output and. consequently. to elevate their income
and their standard of living through the accessibility to simple and appropriate
technology. In the same way. agricultural development should not be confused with
high mechanization which profits. in many cases, only the rich and minority farmers.
Hypotheses which sustain this study can be summarized as follows:
1. The Zairian agricultural crisis could be easily observed from recent production
statistics and is the result of wrong economic policy which neglects agriculture
and. then. strengthens underdevelopment and poverty.
2. An adequate strategy of agricultural development is possible provided that agri-
cultural structures and causes of the crisis are carefully analyzed. Especially relevant
to this is the role of the State and the commercial bourgeoisie's coalition which
exploits peasants through very low agricultural prices and. then. prevents them
from improving their productivity beyond self-sufficiency.
This study intends to analyze the current situation of Zairian agriculture: its struc-
tures and perspectives. It emphasizes a correct explanation of causes of the agricul-
tural crisis in Zaire from peasants' opinions. interests and motivations.
Accordingly. this study suits with the "Agrarian populism theory" as defined by
Richards (1985). Agrarian populism theory had been initiated in the late 19th century
among some Russian socialists and "family farmers" in the United States,
In contradistinction to the views of many orthodox Marxists. particularly Lenin
in his analysis of "the differentiation of the peasantry" (Lenin. 1982). the Russian
populists refuted "evolutionist" interpretations of agrarian change. arguing instead
that it would be possible to pass from feudalism to socialism without capitalist agri-
culture as an intervening stage.
Translated in action. the populist approach sought to transform Russian agricul-
ture through appeal to peasant economic interests and cultural values. and through
the improvement of existing peasant institutions and systems of production. The most
popular representative of this theory in Russia was the agricultural economist. A. V.
Chayanov.
American populism was a political movement organized by small-scale farmers
against urban-based financial speculators. Under a populist rubric. extension workers
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were truly "agents" rather than the "educators". "communicators" even "salesmcn"
they have since become.
In Africa. the term populism has been used to describe peasant resistance move-
ments dirccted against colonial penetration and also in a programmatic sense as a
rallying call for pro-ruraL pro-peasant development strategies.
Richards (I985) refers to this approach as a "People's Science" which enable to
undcrtake a successful agricultural revolution in Africa. Populist arguments which
sustain his research can be summarized in three points:
1. Whereas much of Africa's rural population is scattered and poor, it is also inven-
tively self-reliant. Inventive self-reliance is one of Africa's most precious resources
and development initiatives should aim to maximize the utilization of this human
resource.
2. The most effective and rapid rates of agricultural change will occur when state
resources are used to back up changes that small-scale farmers are already keen
to make.
3. Most rural development programmcs have failed because of lack of popular
participation in project design and the development of new technologies. This
results either in inappropriate innovations or in support of the least appropriate
groups in farming community. Typically, project inputs fail to work as intended
or they end up in the hands of non farmers (merchants. transporters. civil servants,
politicians).
Agrarian populism theory can be approached as the guiding principle which affirms
that "sympathy with the victims of historical process and scepticism about the victor's
claim provide essential safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology"
(Barrington. 1966: 523).
In the same way. Nzongola (1986: 10) has notcd also that "it is a question of
whether one analyzes society from the standpoint of the dominant groups, who have
a vested interest in mystifying the way society works, or from the standpoint of ordi-
nary people. who have nothing to lose from truthful analysis of their predicament".
In order to confront the contradictory interests bctween different social groups in
the Zairian economy. I use the Marxist dialectics. especially the class struggle con-
cept. which considers each social reality as a totality including contradictions and
conflicts. The dialectical method intends to disclose these contradictions and to under-
stand them in an incessant movement of thesis. antithesis and synthesis.
Besides, agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa presents many common features (e.g.
dualist structures. important economic contribution) and faces almost the same
problems oflaw productivity. lack of infrastructure and improved technology. illitera-
cy. etc. Indeed. in spite of important mining resources (copper. cobalt. diamond.
tin. etc.). Zaire is. first of all. an agricultural country and can justly be considered as
a case study in an African context.
The actual situation of Zairian agriculture is very similar to other mineral exporting
countries such as Nigeria. Zambia and Gabon. ]n these countries. the agricultural
sector has been generally weakened for the benefit of mining production. Thus.
economic crisis in these countries is mainly an agricultural crisis. For instance, Zaire
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is now running into debt (about 7 billion dollars) mainly for massive food imports
v,'hich represent more than 40 % of national food requirement (against only 1%
before 1960).
Further, the agricultural sector which contributed to almost 50% of the GDP
before the independence accounts nowadays for less than 15 %. This decrease can be
also observed about export earnings and other economic indicators as shown further
in this study. The agricultural crisis explains the steady dependence of Zairian econo-
my upon one export product. copper. It explains also the paradoxical situation of the
country potentially very rich but whose population (about 60 % in rural areas) is
among the poorest in Africa with a per capita income evaluated at 200 dollars per
year.
Thus. the Zairian analysis is viewed here as a case study in an African context
without minimizing the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa is a region of great diversity in
terms of size, populations, natural resources, geographic situation and political
systems.
Below I will: (1) present some aspects of the agricultural crisis in Sub-Saharan
Africa; (2) analyze dualistic structure of Zairian agriculture and its impact on the
national economy ~ (3) discuss formal explanations admitted by public institutions to
justify the current situation of the agricultural sector and thence, specify the respon-
sibility of the coalition between the "commercial bourgeoisie" and the Zairian state
in the process of peasants' exploitation~ and (4) conclude the paper by a short appre-
ciation on perspectives to solve the current agricultural crisis.
THE PROBLEM OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S AGRICULTURE
Agriculture remains the principal component of economic development in most
African countries. The following arguments can be advanced to support this assertion:
1. Except some mining and oil exporting countries, most African countries receive
their foreign currency mainly from agricultural exports. For instance. Chad and
Sudan receive 97 %of their export-earnings from agriculture.
2. The agricultural sector contributes to more than 40 %of the GDP in many African
countries (e.g. Burundi: 65%~ Ethiopia: 56%; Gambia: 58%).
3. The percentage of economically active population engaged in agriculture still
remains very high (e.g. Burkina Faso: 87%; Tanzania: 86%: Senegal: 80%:
Rwanda: 93 %).
4. The industrial sector is still an embryo in Africa and needs a dynamic agriculture
for capital accumulation (raw materials and financial means).
Consequently. it is absurd to think of development in Africa without adequate
agricultural policy as it is the case currently in many countries. Today. more than
20 countries in Africa have to deal with starvation problems while malnutrition,
especially for small children, is almost a generalized phenomenon.
The United-Nations statistics show that Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of
the world where per capita food production has declined over the past 20 years.
Indeed, between 1970 and 1978, Sub-Saharan African annual per capita food produc-
tion fell to -1.3 %(Gakou, 1987).
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Table I provides interesting data about the situation of per capita food production
in Sub-Saharan African countries.
Countrics belonging to A group have an average index of per capita food produc-
tion (106) higher than the index of basic year (1969-1971 = 100). But they have also
recorded a high annual demographic growth rate (3.9 %).
Among countries of B group, the demographic growth rate is 2.4 %per year. while
the average index of per capita food production (90) has decrcased comparcd to the
basic period. Zaire belongs to this group with an index per capita of 92 and demo-
graphic ratc of 2.8 %per year. However. in Zaire's case. foodstuffs. except cassava,
have not recorded any progression, but. on the contrary. a diminution of total produc-
tion in absolutc terms.
The situation is the worst in countries of C group with a demographic growth rate
of 2.9 %per year and a food production index below 90 compared to the basic period
(1969-1971 = 100).
This food crisis which hits most African countries is generally justified by natural
calamities such as rain fall shortage. Ncverthclcss. the wrong economic policies
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followed by these countries which have stressed their investment effort on the mining
sector rather than on agriculture, or have concentrated agricultural investment on
cash crop production rather than on food production and have almost excluded
peasants from the development process for the benefit of plantations. large-scale
farms. etc. have important negative impact on agricultural development in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
In spite of repeated political declarations and so-called Rural Development Pro-
grammes. African peasants. who constitute the majority of global population. remain
economically very poor. For instance, in Zaire's case the rural per capita revenue is
about 10 times lower than urban per capita income (Saint-Moulin, 1973).
Poverty in African rural areas is largely a result of low land productivity. while the
agricultural sector still remains the main activity and source of income for the rural
economy. It is curious to notice that most African countries. with an agricultural
population representing more than 70% of global population are unable to cover
national food requirements.
On the other hand, in developed countries. less than 10 %(3.1 % in United States)
of the economically active population produces enough to feed all of their popula-
tions, to export and. beyond. to aid Africa and other developing countries.
This situation contrasts sharply with the fact that Africa has 25~,{ of the world's
potential arable land, while its population represents only 10% of the world popula-
tion. This obvious gap between the agricultural situation in Africa and that of in-
dustrialized countries can be explained, partially. by the technical and scientific gap
concerning means of production utilized in these different countries. Table 2 illustrates
this gap and the weakness of Africa's agricultural productivity.
Low productivity of African agriculture is largely due to the generalized use of
archaic tools (hoe. machete. spade. etc.) which prevent peasants from realizing im-
portant investments. But we must also carefully analyze why peasants. for a long
time and in spite of deep social, political, and economic changes, still continue to
use these tools and, then, are unable to have access to improved techniques.
Further, rural exodus, especially among young generations who refuse to engage
themselves in hard. misremunerated agricultural work. is also a cause of the current
crisis. Thus. the rural population engaged in agriculture decreases while the urban
population is increasing. In many cases the urban population includes an important
proportion of unemployed. then passive. persons to feed. The case of Zaire is revealing
on this topic. Table 3 shows the evolution of the rural. urban and total population in
Zaire from J930 to 1984.
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Table 3. Evolution of Zaire's population (total, urban and rural).
Year Total population (A) Rural population (B) BIA (%) Urban population (C)
1930 8,803,513 8,433,766 95.8 369.747
1935 9,775,191 9,203,024 94.2 572,167
1940 10,353,909 9,336,010 90.2 1,017,899
1945 10,507,149 8.941,748 85.1 1,565,401
1950 11,331,793 9,169,396 80.9 2,162,397
1955 12,562,631 9,712,547 77.3 2,850.084
1960 14,217,732 10,805,412 76.0 3,412,320
1965 16,562,503 15,018,192 89.0 1,825,187
1970 19,286,207 16,422,700 85.2 2.863,507
1975 22.582,230 16,105,091 71.3 6,477.139
1980 26,377,260 17,366,917 63.8 9,010,343
1984 29,671,407 16,722,805 56.4 12,948,602















It is also meaningful to notice that peasants accept hard sacrifices to provide re-
latively good education for their children, not to become progressive or prosperous
farmers, but, on the contrary, to avoid for them the low social condition of their com-
munity.
Peasants' agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa. extensive and based on a fallow
system. faces, now in some places, the demographic pressure which reduces sensitively
the fallow delay and, then. induces ecological troubles due to the deforestation and
cultivation of poor. marginal lands. The severe soil erosion experienced in South
Kivu can illustrate environmental troubles caused by extensive cultivation in an
overpopulated region.
Under these conditions. a real effort should be made to understand the nature of
peasants' agriculture. the reasons for the current crisis and what should be done to
improve its productivity in order to achieve integral development goals.
ANALYSIS OF DUALIST STRUCTURES OF ZAIRIAN AGRICULTURE
1. Composition of the Agricultural Sector in Zaire
Zaire has abundant arable land and only 5%of this arable land is estimated to be
under cultivation (Table 4).
Abundance of arable land is an important opportunity for agricultural develop-
Table 4. Land use in Zaire (1984).
Land area
















Source: FAa, 1985: 49.
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Table 5. Composition of agricultural production in Zaire (in millions of Zaires at prices of 1970).
Products 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
--
A. Agriculture for exportation 26.1 21.1 22.1 21.3 21.1 20.8 21.8
Oil palm products 2.7 1.9 2.8 2.9 2.0 1.7 2.0
Coffee 11.8 9.1 10.7 9.8 9.9 9.1 11.2
Caoutchouc 3.4 2.2 2.5 2.4 1.9 1.7 1.9
Wood 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 3.0
Tea 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
Cocoa 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Others 5.2 5.3 3.2 3.2 4.0 5.1 2.6
B. Agriculture for national
industry 13.0 19.2 17.4 19.2 18.8 18.7 19.2
Oil palm products 3.0 3.7 3.3 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.3
Wood 1.8 5.7 3.2 3.8 3.7 4.5 4.3
Colton 2.2 2.7 3.7 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.8
Others 6.0 7.1 7.2 8.8 8.5 7.7 7.8
C. Commercial food production 40.1 41.3 44.6 45.8 47.1 48.1 49.1
Food-stuffs· 26.8 28.0 30.8 31.9 32.8 33.8 34.8
Breeding 6.8 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.3 7.3 7.3
Fishing 6.5 6.5 6.8 6.8 7.0 7.0 7.0
Total 79.2 81.7 84.1 86.3 87.0 87.6 90.1
·Maize, cassava, rice, plantains. fruits. vegetables
Source: Banque du Zaire. 1985: 74.
ment. while the diversity of Zaire's climate and relief (high lands. savanna, forests)
allows for the production of a whole gamut of food and cash crops. Zairian agricul-
tural production can be subdivided into three groups: Foodstuffs. cash crops for
export and raw materials for national industry.
Zaire exports about 11 items. According to Table 5, the coffee has been the main
agricultural export because it provides about 50 %of the total export earnings generat-
ed by the agricultural sector: 48 %in 1980 and 51 % in 1984. We can also notice the
disappearance of cotton as a Zairian export product and the importation of this item
to cover requirements of the national textile industry. The agricultural sector also
provides national industry with raw material, mainly oil palm products. tobacco,
cotton. fibres (Urena-Punga) and sugar-cane. Cotton and fibres are produced ex-
clusively by peasants. while other products come from large-scale plantations.
Food production originates from peasants' production and is constituted mainly
of cassava. rice. maize and plantains which are largely consumed by the Zairian popu-
lation. It includes also breeding and fishing production.
Table 6 shows that subsistence agriculture is very important in Zaire. Its value is
higher than commercial agriculture. Table 6 shows also the dualistic character of
Table 6. Contribution of commercial agriculture and subsistence agriculture to the Gross Domestic
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Zairian agriculture: Traditional agriculture devoted to self-sufficient production and
modern agriculture which produces for the national market and exportation. This
dualistic structure results from the coexistence, on the Zairian territory, of two eco-
nomic systems: The subsistence economy and the modern or commercial sector.
These two sectors are. in most cases, in juxtaposition without integration and exert or
suffer perverse effects because of this coexistence. In the following section I intend to
analyse in more detail these two sectors relating to Zairian agriculture.
2. The Peasants' Agriculture
Peasants occupy the majority of the total populaLon: 74.3 % in )970: 59.3 % in
1984 (DADR, )987). This sector can release only an insufficient commercial surplus
which does not cover national food requirements. In 1984, the commercialized food
represented only 23 %of total production achieved by the peasant community. The
self-sufliciency accounted for 77 % during the same year (Banque du ZaIre, 1985).
However. in the hinterland of big cities and regions which benefit from a well main-
tained transportation infrastructure, peasants can sell more than 50% of their total
output.
Peasants' surplus is commercialized through middlemen in very disadvantageous
conditions. According to one survey, from 1966 to 1970, the part of retail prices on
the Kinshasa market which was given to the food producer decreased from 36 % to
]5%(BIRD, 1972). The situation has worsened since then, as shown afterwards in
this study.
Technically, traditional agriculture, also called itinerant agriculture, is characterized
by a fallow system which allows soil regeneration. The fallow delay depends on possi-
bilities ofarable land (6-10 years in savanna and) 0-15 years in forest area). Generally
very simple tools arc still utilized and poor stocking conditions cause important
damage.
The average size of a family farnl is small: 0.6 ha per peasant in forest areas and
1-2 ha in savanna areas. Generally agricultural inputs such as fertilizers or insecti-
cides are limitedly used by peasants. except the case of small-scale agriculture around
dwelling places where the domestic waste is used as manure.
Concerning social and economic organization, family labour constitutes the main
factor of agricultural production. Especially. female labour represents about 90 %of
the total labour force engaged in food production. In many cases, the man stops
working just after land preparation.
Land legislation stipulates that the soil i, the exclusive, inalienable and impre-
scriptible property of the state. However. the land still remains a collective property
on a clanic level. The leader distributes arable land to every peasant, while the produc-
tion is carried out on an individual property basis. Generally, there are not important
land problems in Zaire, except in the eastern overpopulated region of Kivu where the
traditional chief called "Mwami" is still powerful enough in land distribution and
claim tenure from peasants.
Food production constitutes the dominant activity in rural areas. However, in some
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societies. other activities such as handicraft. fishing. hunting and breeding can surpass
food production. This is the case of the Lokele fishers in the Region of"Haut-Zaire"
and cattle breeding in 8ashi society (South Kivu).
Rural areas. where the traditional agriculture is practised are characterized by the
absence of basic social infrastructures such as health centres and schools except some
private initiatives mainly from Catholic and Protestant missionaries (for instance
modem medical centres of Tshikaji and Nyakunde). Elementary and secondary
schools. besides general crisis which characterizes the educational system in Zaire.
are insufficient while their teachers have been demobilized because of considerable
delay and irregularity in the payment of their salaries.
During the colonial era. Belgium had tried to improve traditional agriculture by
introducing the "Paysannat" system. This was done in order to replace the itinerant
agriculture which causes soil destruction by intensive agriculture which assures
perenniality of soil productivity (Stanner, 1955: 469).
After 1960. this system which was still in its experimental stage, collapsed and
attempts to revive it have almost failed. Then. traditional agriculture has not changed
its structure since the colonial era. Techniques used remain very simple, and the
productivity remains very low in spite of a steady growth of the urban population:
24 %in 1960 and 34.16 %in 1980. Besides, peasants have no access to financial means
in order to purchase agricultural inputs and to improve their land productivity.
3. The Commercial Agriculture
Commercial agriculture. introduced under Belgian rule. is constituted by large-
scale plantations and agri-business. This sector is specialized in cash crops. mainly
coffee. caoutchouc, oil palm products. wood and tea. Under Belgian rule. this agri-
culture was practised quasi exclusively by Europeans. owners of individual large-
scale farms and capitalist firms. Before 1960, the European producers shared 95 %
of oil palm products. 87 %of coffee production (robusta). 97 %of tea. 99 %of cocoa
and 90 %of rubber production (Ndongala. 1966).
This type of agriculture. so-called modern sector. utilized high techniques in the
production and commercialization processes. It had easy access to private and public
credit institutions and was the sole beneficiary of agricultural research results which
were conceived exclusively according to its requirements.
The average size of individual farms was about 100 ha. wllile trans-national lirms
had exploited more than 7.000 ha. Some of them. such as the HCB (Huilerie du Congo
Beige). currently PLZ (Plantations Lever au Zaire). were granted more than 350.000
ha. Today. large-scale plantations and firms belong. in many cases. to foreign in-
vestors generally associated with Zairian commercial and political bourgeoisie. The
production of this sector is merely orientated to exporting or to provide national
industry with raw material.
National private investments are particularly important to coffee plantations be-
cause of relatively good prices in the international market and possibilities of fraudu-
lent trade with neighbouring countries (Uganda, Sudan, Burundi. etc.). Tea. cocoa.
and oil plam are also produced by modern plantations. However. along with these
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large-scale firms, exist also many small plantations (essentially cofTee plantations)
mostly mismanaged.
Since 1970, and despite the promulgation of a very liberal investment legislation,
commercial agriculture is facing investment problems due to foreign investors' sus-
picions since the nationalization (Zairianization and Radicalization) measures taken
by the Zairian government in 1973-1974.
Lack of long-term investments in this sector due to the preference of the national
bourgeoisie to invest in speculative activities instead of long-term productive projects
and also to the limited opportunities of public investments in agriculture, explains
once more why the contribution of plantations to export-earning and the GOP has
been decreasing for a long time.
4. Transformation of Dualistic Structure
Generally. Zairian agriculture still keeps the same fundamental structures in-
herited from the colonization: Along with a commercial agriculture which uses
modern techniques and has strong economic links with developed capitalist countries
for whom it works, there still exists a traditional sector devoted to self-sufficient pro-
duction and characterized by low land productivity.
However. agricultural development requires the transformation of these dualistic
structures. This transformation consists in the modernization of traditional agriculture
and in the introversion of commercial sector. Thus. the modern sector will also pro-
duce foodstuffs without excluding peasants from the national economy. This structural
transformation suggests an appropriate industrialization process which should be
privileged in Zaire's case: An integrated national industry supplying agriculture with
modern inputs and utilizing local agricultural products as raw material.
Agriculture can sustain integrated development provided that its products are
manufactured by national firms and its inputs (e.g. equipment, fertilizers) supplied
by national industry. It is hence possible to dispose of an integrated industrial circuit
instead of having a juxtaposition of heterogeneous units, as it is the case today. Nowa-
days. modern plantations and peasants' agriculture are both facing a serious crisis:
The contribution of the agricultural sector to the GOP. export-earnings and labour
force has drastically decreased. From the stagnation which has characterized this
sector just after 1960, we are experiencing now a steady regression since 1970. What
is the meaning of this regression?
CONTRIBUTION OF THE AGRICULTCRAL SECTOR TO THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY
I refer to three economic indicators to appreciate the importance of agriculture
in Zairian economy: Its contribution to the GOP composition. to export-earnings
and to the labour force.
I. Contribution of Agriculture to the GDP composition
Table 7 shows that the agricultural contribution to the GDP has decreased from
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Table 7. Part it ion of commercial GDp·.
1978 1980 1984








2. Mining production and
metallurgy 19.3 18.9 28.6 17.5 14.4 27.1 31.0
3. Manufacturing industry 8.5 12.6 8.7 10.6 7.6 3.8 2.5
4. Construction 4.3 2.2 2.6 3.8 2.8 3.3 4.2
5. Electricity, water 2.0 0.9 1.I 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.1
6. Transport 9.1 fJ.7 9.8 10.1 2.1 2.4 1.3
7. Commerce and services 34.3 47.4 39.6 47.5 56.1 46.4 42.3
8. Olhers 1.6 3.9 1.9
Commercial GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
·Commercial GDP consists only of activities belonging to cash economy. Thus, the subsistence agri-
culture, other self-sufficient activities (e.g. housing) and sources ofenergy are not concerned.
Source: Peemans, 1981: 216: Banque du Zaire, 1985: 71.
year to year, especially after 1960. We notice that the contribution of the agricultural
sector has passed from 22.5% in 1958. 9.5% in 1972 and to 16.9% in 1984. This con-
tribution is still lower than its level before 1960. On the contrary, commerce and
services have considerably increased in importance: 34.3 % in 1958. 47.5 % in 1972.
56.1 % in 1978 and 42.3 % in 1984. The manufacturing industry has not improved
its contribution: 12.6% in 1966 and only 2.5% in 1984.
Thus. agricultural recession has resulted in the high rise of the tertiary sector, while
the manufacturing industry has consistently diminished its significance from year to
year. Shall we conclude that this structural change in the GOP composition is a sign
of economic dynamism and therefore constitutes a development indicator?
Indeed. according to research findings of economists such as Rosier (1968) and
Malassis (1973), the historic process of economic development in industrialized
countries has always been accompanied by the decline of agriculture's contribution
to the GOP. Agriculture which had contributed to more than 20 %of the GOP at the
beginning of this century (32% in France in 1910: 22% in U.S.A. in 1900 and 54.2%
in Japan in 1920) has since then accounted for less than 8 % (3 % in U.S.A.: 5.9 % in
Sweden and 4 %in U.K.) in 1967 (Table 8). This decline is one of the consequences of
the industrialization process which brought on the expansion of the service sector.
Besides. in developed countries. the regression of the contribution of the agricultural
sector to the GOP composition does not concern quantities produced. In these coun-
tries. the volume of agricultural production increases due to the improvement of tech-
nical productivity, while its contribution to the GOP decreases due to the diversifica-
tion of economic activities henceforth dominated by the industrial sector.
Table 8. Part of agriculture in the GDP of some industrial countries.
Countries 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
I. United Stales 22 19 13 10 9
2. Sweden 19 19 15 II 10
3. United Kingdom 7 6 6 3 4
4. France 32 21 22















Source: Rosier, 1968: 115; Malassis. 1973: 271; Ogura. 1979: 673.
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Table 9. Evolution of agricultural production in Zaire.
Products 1959 1966 1970 1974 1975
(1000 M.T.)
A. Agriculture for exportation
Oil palm products 3,353.0 146.0 224.3 135.8 112.6
Coffee 56.6 36.1 65.0 77.7 58.9
Caoutchouc 40.6 30.4 31.0 26.6 24.2
Cotton (fibre) 52.8 7.4 8.6 1.6 1.0
Tea 3.5 6.1 7.3 5.9 4.7
Wood (timber, sawn wood)* 3.9 4.1 4.5 4.7 5.3
Cocoa 166.3 317.0 162.2 54.6 18.8
B. Agriculture for national industry
Oil palm products 59.4 68.7 86.0 63.7 92.4
Rough timber* 121.0 104.0 297.4 264.0 215.3
Cotton (fibre) 10.4 7.4 8.6 14.9 15.3
Sawn wood* 153.0 94.0 116.2 105.3 61.3
C. Commercial food production
Cassava 100.0 100.0 670.7 750.0 800.0
Banana 110.0 350.0 310.0 400.0 430.0
Maize 110.0 65.0 90.0 160.0 125.0
Rice 165.0 410.0 90.0 150.0 135.0
Meat 31.0 24.8 39.0 40.0 40.0
Fish 127.1 40.0 40.0 90.0 75.0
Source: Van der Steen, 1977: 28: *: 1,000 m3•
Can we explain the Zairian situation in the same way and consider agricultural
recession a result of industrial development. as it is the case in Table 8? It is not surely
the case because agricultural regression in Zaire is not accompanied by any industrial
development. On the contrary, the industrial sector is also in a crisis because its con-
tribution to the GDP has notably decreased (2.5 % in 1984 against 12.6 % in 1966). In
Zaire's case. on the contrary. we notice the diminution of both produced commodities
and GOP contribution. Table 9 illustrates well the regression of agricultural produc-
tion from 1959 to 1975. In 1975. the total colton production representcd scarcely 26%
ofthc production reachcd in 1959; oil palm products (exports) 3.4%: rice 82%. etc.
Other products. except cassava and plantains. have not registered significant pro-
gression during these late years.
This is particularly obvious for main foodstuffs such as maize and meat. which
have recorded a poor growth rate compared to the volume of global population which
has increased more than twice between 1959 and 1975.
Recent data from the Zairian National Bank show that the degradation of agri-
Table 10. Indices of agricultural production (1970 = 100).
1978 1979 1980 1981
a: Average index elaborated by the Bank of Zaire for the following products: oil palm products, coffee.
wood, rubber, tea, cocoa, cotton.
b: Average index for the following products: cassava, plantains, maize, rice, fruits, vegetables, breed-
ing, fishing.
Source: Banque du Zaire, 1985: 90.
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cultural production is quite significant from 1975 to 1982. Taking 1970 as the basic
year (1970 = 100), indices of agricultural production appear as shown in Table 10.
Thus. agricultural regression in the GDP composition. far from signifying a devel-
opment process, constitutes rather one of the obvious manifestations of the economic
crisis which affects the country and results, among others, in the diminution of agri-
cultural production.
Indeed. excessive extension of the service sector has no relationship with the historic
process of economic development observed in industrialized countries. It is true that
when the improvement of technical productivity occurs in the agricultural sector and
industry and then the country advances to a massive consumption stage of goods
and services, the tertiary sector should be developed in order to solve problems of
commodities distribution and adaptation to consumers' tastes.
The excessive importance of the tertiary sector in Zaire is explained neither by
improvement of agricultural and industrial productivity nor by the apparition of new
requirements due to the elevation of the standard of living. It is rather a question of
underdevelopment structural deviation which originates from rural exodus and
produces a hypertrophic "informal sector" in urban centres.
Consequently. the decline mentioned above has nothing to do with economic
development process but is rather a sign of underdevelopment.
2. Part of Agriculture in Economically Active Population
The second indicator which will allow us to appreciate the evolution of an agri-
cultural sector in Zaire's economy concerns wage-earning labour and the importance
of the rural population to the total population.
Recent statistical data concerning the labour force in Zaire are almost unavailable.
Complete data are collected only for years before 1960 except some interesting in-
formation given by the Ministry of National Economy in 1973 which allow a com-
parative analysis with the last decade of the colonial period (Ministcre de I'Economie
Nationale. 1973). The same document has emphasized the fact that in current
conditions it is impossible to achieve an exhaustive analysis of labour phenomena in
Zaire because of the lack of necessary data.
Tahle 11. Distribution of wage-earning workers in principal economic branches.
Branches 1950 1956 1958 1973 (%l
I. Agriculture 24.8 25.1 28.4 28.7
2. Mining 11.9 8.8 7.9 14.6
3. Manufacturing industry 14.0 11.9 9.2 26.6
4. Commerce 6.4 6.8 6.2 4.9
5. Transport 6.5 7.7 7.0 16.8
6. Construction 8.8 10.4 9.5 4.6
7. Services 2.0 3.3 4.2 3.8
8. Others 25.6 26.8 27.6
Total 100 100 --IOc-O-----,-IO~O:----
(Number of workers) 962,009 1,197,896 1,102,270 405,784
Source: Banque Centrale du Congo Beige et du Rwanda-Urundi, 1959: 79; Ministrere de I'Economie
Nationale, 1973: 338.
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However, Table 11 gives some idea of the evolution of an agricultural sector in
total wage-earning labour. This table shows that the agricultural contribution still
remains important to the total labour force: 24.8 % in 1950. 28.4 % in 1958 and
28.7 % in 1973. Here it concerns only wage-earning labour in the modern sector
(plantations and capitalist agro-industrial firms).
Contrary to other economic indicators. agriculture's part has not decreased after
the indepcndence concerning wage-earning labour. But we can also notice that this
tendency denotes only the inability of other sectors to create new jobs in sufficient
numbers and also thc stagnation of agricultural productivity in the modern sector.
The importance of agriculture to the global active population becomes more
explicit when we compare the evolution of the agricultural population with thc total
population. Figure I enables us to follow the evolution of Zairc's population from
1930 to 1984.
Population involved (directly or indircctly) in agriculture remains preponderant in
spite of geometrical growth of urban demography due to rural exodus.
Rural population was 95.8% of the total population in 1930.80.9% in 1950 and
78.5 % in 1970. But this importance is now decreasing from year to year: 63.4%
in 1980 and 56.4 % in 1984. This decrease corresponds to a steady growth of the
urban population: 19.1 % in 1950 and 43.6% in 1984. We can also notice that the
increase of the rural population compared to that of the urban population from 1960
to 1970 was mainly due to the political insccurity of the first years of the independence.














Fig. 1. Evolution of Zairian population (total, urban and rural) from 1930 to 1984 (Source: DADR,
1987: 59).
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Table 12. Evolution of agriculture's part in the labour force of some industrial countries.
Countries 1900 1930 1965 1970 1975 1980
----,--:-c-- -- ---~--
1. United States 38 21 5.4 4.3 3.9 3.5
2. Sweden 43 30 11.1 8.3 6.9 5.7
3. United Kingdom 8 6 3.4 2.8 2.7 2.6
4. France 44 36 17.9 13.6 11.1 8.6
5. Italy 59 47 24.8 18.8 15.4 12.0
6. Japan 68.4 49.8 26.4 19.6 15.4 11.2









could expand IO times more than rural population: Equivalent to 81.5 % annual
augmentation in urban centres against 8.5 % in rural areas. Does this decrease of
rural population (from 95.8 % in 1930 to 56.4~;': in 1984) mean a manpower trans-
fer from agriculture to the non-agricultural sector, as observed in the development
process of today's industrial countries?
Indeed. referring to the economic process of these countries. we notice that develop-
ment has always been accompanied by a diminution of the agricultural population as
shO\m in Table 12. The percentage of agricultural labour has decreased gradually as
the industrial and service sectors progress. This was made possible due to the improve-
ment of agricultural labour productivity (7.0 units in 1910 against 60.00 units in 1960-
64 in United States) which allows for important production with only very few
workers (Bairoch. 1967).
This is not the Zaire's case. Thc decrease of agricultural population is not due to
technical improvement. On the contrary. agricultural productivity has passed from
6.9 units in 1946-50 to 5.0 units in 1960-64 (Bairoch. 1967). Only rural exodus can
explain present rural depopulation which results in proliferation of ghettos. unem-
ployment and poverty in urban centres.
Lack of improved techniqucs coupled with rural depopulation has resulted in the
regression of agricultural production already noticed in Table 7. The decrease of
produced quantities automatically repercusses on export-earnings which have di-
minished accordingly.
3. Part of Agriculture in the Export-earnings
Developed countries have a diversified economy and their export-earnings from
agriculture arc generally negligible. This situation is possible because of the enlarged
industrial sector which furnishes essential investment opportunities. Also these
countries arc exporters of manufacturing commodities, while agricultural exports
represent only a negligible percentage of their external market (except for few coun-
tries such as Australia and New Zealand).
Table 13 and Fig. 2 show the composition of Zairian exports and then. the place
occupied by agriculture compared to other sectors from 1950 to 1984. We can notice
that in 1950 agriculture furnished about the same amount of foreign currency as the
mining sector: 48.87% against 49.82 % for the mining sector. This contribution has
progressively decreased: 33.02% in 1956 and 41.76% in 1959.
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Table 13. Evolution of structures of Zairian Exports.











83.73 84.72 73.96 75.45
32.81 43.76 44.20 44.23
39.20 20.30 10.13 7.32
6.72 4.25 4.56 8.19
14.46 11.86 9.90 10.20
9.55 8.04 6.48 7.91
1.14 0.74 0.39 0.29
0.59 1.03 0.46 0.44
1.81 3.42 16.15 14.35
1. Mining exports 49.82 65.86 56.42 83.39 81.72
Copper 23.90 40.27 32.21 65.95 55.43
Cobalt 5.41 7.16 5.79 5.97 10.60
Diamond 3.71 4.95 6.95 5.09 7.00
2. Agricultural exports 48.87 33.02 41.76 15.95 15.65
Coffee 9.23 8.19 12.40 5.57 6.19
Caoutchouc 1.39 3.81 4.49 1.83 1.33
Oil palm products 15.88 8.67 12.39 4.60 4.68
3. Industrial exports 1.31 1.21 1.82 0.66 1.37
4. Others 1.26
TotaI 1()() 1()() 1()() 100 1()() 1()() 1()() 1()() I()() I()()
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Fig. 2. Evolution of agriculture in the Zairian export-eamings (Source: Banque Centrale du Congo
Bclge et du Rwanda-Urundi, 1959: 84; Banque du Zaire, 1985: 27).
Since 1960 there has been a total reversing tendency and agriculture's contribution
fluctuates around 15 %. Copper is now the principal source of Zairian foreign cur-
rency. The contribution of this sole commodity reached 65.95 %of the total foreign
currency in 1970 and 55.43 % in 1975. The mining sector contributes almost SO %
nowadays. The fact that export-earnings generated by the agricultural sector pro-
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gressively vanish cannot bc interpreted as a sign of economic dynamism or structural
change as it was the case in industrialized countries when they accomplished their
"Industrial Revolution'". It is, on the contrary. a question of economic stagnation due
to the contraction of agricultural production. This agricultural depression has resulted
in a strict dependence of Zairian economy on one export commodity. copper. Thus,
Zairian economy, deeply linked to copper only, is suffering also from the wide in-
stability of its prices in the international market.
The analysis of three indicators above (sectoral distribution of economically active
population, GDP composition and export returns) makes it clear that agricultural
contribution has steadly decreased since the 1960s. This decline cannot be interpreted
as a sign of economic and structural change as it was the case in developed countries
because the agricultural crisis has provoked only a hypertrophic tertiary sector, while
industry has not registered notable improvement.
Below I will attempt to analyze why agriculture. since the independence, has so
far collapsed. At first. T discuss formal causes of the agricultural crisis as it is
explained by Zairian official institutions.
FORMAL EXPLANATION OF AGRICULTURAL COLLAPSE IN ZAIRE
The vulnerability of Zairian economy has been masked for a long time by the rela-
tively high price of copper in the international market. But. with the copper slump of
the I970s, agriculture appeared, clearly and rapidly, as a key sector in the national
economy. The agricultural crisis which has hit the country for many years has been
explained in different ways by the national ruling class and by specialists of Zaire's
economy.
Below, I intend to summarize different obstacles and appreciate their real impact
on the current situation of Zaire's agriculture. I endeavour to understand the
meaning of government's rhetoric about the current situation and its efforts to over-
come this crisis. Causes discussed in this section are generally accepted by the govern-
ment's rhetoric and by most researchers interested in Zairian agriculture. My main
aim in the following analysis is to give my opinion on the real impact of these different
obstacles on the current agrarian crisis in Zaire.
I. Degradation of the Transportation Infrastructure
Among causes generally advanced to explain Zaire's agricultural crisis, the trans-
portation problem always appears as a central component. About 30 years ago,
Zaire had at its command a large and diversified transportation network. The national
territory was covered by 140,000 km of roads which assured good communication
among persons and commodities inside the country. This abundant road network
was kept regularly in good repair and then facilitated internal commerce between
different regions and urban centres, especially the evacuation of export cash crops
(coffee. palm products. cotton. etc.).
Also, urban centres have been supplied with foodstuffs and raw materials with
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reasonable delay. The Decennial Plan (1950-1959). defined and achieved under
Belgian rule, stressed transportation infrastructure and collective equipments (medical
centres. housing and water supply). Despite the fact that this road infrastructure was
essentially conceived for the requirements of export commerce. it has playcd an im-
portant rol~ as an economic incentive in rural areas.
Today, many rural regions have lost communication with urban centres. For in-
stance. the current condition of the important road which connects Kisangani to
North Kivu and Ituri illustrates well the degradation of Zairian networks. Prices of
foodstuffs in the Kisangani urban market depend on the condition of this road:
Meat, poultry. fish. maize. etc. can cost twice or three times as much as their normal
prices in case of traffic interruption on this road.
Roads connecting rural areas arc quasi-abandoned. except in regions where agri-
business depend on peasants' production for their supply. They try. then, to keep the
existent network in good repair. In some cases. these capitalist firms are in charge of
the popularization of new techniques (improved seeds and fertilizers). However.
they also contribute to the exploitation of peasants' agriculture by low monopolistic
agricultural prices and compulsory cultivation. This is the case of SOTEXCO (Societe
Textile ct Cotonniere) for cotton production in the Region of "Haut-Zairc" and
COMIGEM (Combinat Industriel de Gemena) for oil palm products and peanuts
in the Region of ·'Equateur".
Some bridges destroyed during the confused period after 1960 have never been
repaired. The public institution, "Office des Routes". created to assure the mainte-
nance of road trallic. has recorded very poor achievemcnt in rural areas and has con-
centrated its efforts only on 45.000 km of main roads. However. minor roads, which
are vital for rural communications. have been committed to the local administration
unequipped with appropriate techniques and materials.
Concerning the railway net\vork: No effort has been made to extend the existent
infrastructure, except timid improvements such as electrification on the line Lu-
bumbashi-Ilebo and utilization of oil engines instead of steam engines. Railway in-
frastructure was conceived for export requirements during the colonial period. Its
extension into rural areas in order to introvert the actual network has not retained
the interest of the current ruling class. In 1960. Zaire's railway network had a length
of 5.012 km; today it is 5.254 km or an augmentation of 242 km in 29 years.
The Zaire River and main affluents (e.g. KasaL Kwango) have an important role
as the transportation infrastructure between the countryside and urban centres. This
is true only for riverside residents. especially between Kinshasa. Kisangani and Hebo
(Kasal Occidental).
The general degradation of transportation infrastructure since 1960 is aggravated.
as far as the agricultural sector is concerned. by the fact that agricultural regions are
disfavoured compared to mining regions. For instance. about 50 %of national railway
traffic and infrastructure are concentrated in the mining region of Shaba. Most
agricultural regions (Kivu. Haut-ZaIre, Bandundu and Equateur). either for food
production or export cash crops. are bad off concerning transportation infrastructure.
Transportation infrastructure is quite insufficient for the size of the country: Only
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1.957 km of roads have been asphaIted. But this poor record is accentuated in most
agricultural regions comparcd to mining rcgions (Shaba and Bas-Zaire especially).
The degradation of Zaire's transportation infrastructure constitutes a very serious
obstacle to economic development. particularly to agricultural development. In some
regions, the lack of good transportation network has confined rural areas to isolation.
Peasants in these regions arc never willing to produce more than their own require-
ments because they lack incentive for commercial surplus.
The government's analysis of the agricultural crisis always emphasized this problem.
According to diverse official reports. the bad condition of the road network is incon-
testably the main constraint to any rural development effort. It prevents the peasants
from receiving agricultural inputs at necessary time, while the marketing of farm
products becomes very hazardous. This situation explains why peasants hesitate to
produce more than their own requirements (Commissariat General au Plan. 1979).
Peasants, in this case. do not augment their production because they cannot sell the
surplus. The transportation problem stresses. then. their marginal condition and
prevents them from taking an active part in the national economy.
On the other hand. urban centres cannot extend their market to these isolated
regions. Accordingly, production potentialities in either rural areas or in the urban
industrial sector remain below normal average level because of lack of economic
incentives. In current conditions. merchants who can reach remote regions are very
few and practise monopolistic prices in these places. They try to maximize their
returns as soon as possible to make up for very high maintenance expenditures. Even
in this case, many rural regions cannot be reached because of transportation impossi-
bilities.
This problem is worsened by the dispersion of rural populations and scattered
villages throughout many regions. which prevent good communication among them
and efficient supervision of rural development projects, The peasants' isolation allows
few economic opportunities for their production. In this way, it can partially explain
the current agricultural crisis.
2. The Inefficiency of Agricultural Research and the Educational System
The second reason generally admitted to explain the agricultural collapse concerns
the inefficiency of agricultural research and educational syslem which has been ex-
plicitly recognized by the Zaire's state. Below I intend to appreciate the real meaning
of this factor in the context of Zairian agriculture.
It has been said that the wcakness of Sub-Saharan Africa's agriculture compared
to other Third World countries results from the inefficiency of agricultural research.
For instance, agricultural development in China and India has been strongly support-
ed by agricultural research which has allowed peasants to use improved seeds, ferti-
lizers, and weed-killers and to exploit land prcviously inappropriate for agricultural
activities (Conseil Mondial d'Alimentation, 1986).
Concerning Zaire's case. agricultural research is actually facing critical situation.
Many serious problems are the cause of this inefficiency. However, during the colonial
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era, Zaire possessed one of the most famous agricultural research centres in Africa:
TNEAC (Tnstitut National d'Etudes Agronomiques au Congo). This Centre, which
specialized in cash crops, had the benefit of sutllcient material resources and technical
manpower of high quality. The efficiency of this Centre and the extensive populariza-
tion of its scientific findings brought Zaire among the biggest exporters of tropical
products at that period.
Today, INEAC has been replaced by INERA (lnstitut National d'Etude et Re-
cherche Agronomique) which has a very important role in the improvement of Zairian
agriculture. However. TNERA still has a very limited impact in rural areas because it
still continues to concentrate its research programmes on export cash crops as was
the case with TNEAC, and also continues to ignore peasants' requirements mainly
concerning food production. INERA, like many governmental research institutions,
is characterized by notorious inefficiency concerning scientific production: There are
no scientific publications except the annual reports reprinting the same unaccom-
plished projects.
Many factors are explicitly recognized as an explanation for this inefficiency: Lack
of financial means, very low salaries which discourage qualified researchers, plethoric
bureaucratic prejudice against scientific production. These features are common to
other governmental research institutions such as CRSN (Centre de Recherche en
Sciences Naturelles). TG (Tnstitut Geographique) and CRSAT (Centre de Recherche
en Sciences Appliquees et Technologies).
The inefficiency of agricultural research institutions is aggravated by the absence or
insufficiency of qualified extension workers in rural areas. Indeed. agricultural re-
search results will be useful provided that they arc widely popularized and accepted
by the users (peasants and large-scale farms).
Many technicians and researchers have given up on rural areas because of transpor-
tation problems. low salaries moreover irregularly paid. lack of appropriate material.
These bad working conditions have limited their credibility among peasants, while
most large-scale capitalist firms have their own research network and scientific
facilities.
Besides. technicians in rural areas still continue to consider a peasant as an irra-
tional. ignorant person and, accordingly. unable to formulate objectively his own
requirements. Under these conditions. it is almost impossible for them to obtain the
peasants' adherence by persuasion.
Then, they invariably have recourse to compulsory methods. This attitude results
from the educational background of technicians and researchers in Zaire. At first,
secondary schools which are devoted to the formation of rural technicians represent
less than 5%of the total public schools. Programmes followed by these schools stress
general education in order to let their students attend different faculties in universities
after their graduation from secondary schools. This fact constitutes a deviation from
the original aim to train intermediate technicians immediately useful in rural areas.
Agricultural training in Zairian universities (IFA: Institut Facultaire Agronomique:
ISEA: Institut Superieur d'Etudes Agronomiques: ISDR: Institut Superieur de
Developpement Rural) is still organized in a colonial optic which considers peasants
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as "inferior people" who must "'earn" everything from the "holder" of a university's
degree. The educational system, as it is currently organized in Zaire. generally
preaches the contempt of peasants' condition. degradation of farm-work and the
importance of rural exodus among young and dynamic generations.
It is paradoxical to state that rural children never learn, during their school years.
anything about environmentaL economic and social problems of their region and
initiatives to solve them. On the contrary. they have been given the idea that the rural
areas from which they originate can assure them neither the prestige nor the revenue
"rightly" expected by educated people.
3. Lack of Financial Means
The government rhetoric also emphasizes the lack of financial means to explain the
poor performance of agriculture. Particularly when the external loans are solicited,
agriculture is always shown as the priority sector which is mostly affected by the lack
of investments. Here I intend to give my opinion on this topic.
The problem of financial resources devoted to agriculture can be better understood
by an analysis of agricultural expenditures in the national budget and agricultural
credit conceded by financial institutions. State's expenditures are grouped into two
rubrics: Ordinary expenditures and investment budget. Table 14 shows that annual
investment expenditures are far behind ordinary expenditures in Zaire's national
budget. This means that the investment etfort has been very weak in this country. But
this lack of investment devoted to extend productive capacities is more manifest in
the agricultural sector. Indeed, agriculture occupies a very insignificant place in the
national budget concerning either ordinary expenditures or investment effort.
Until 1975. the annual ordinary budget has devoted less than 1% to agriculture.
The structural analysis of 1979's ordinary budget, for instance. shows that the Foreign
Office has consumed 5.8 %, Army: 12.43 %, Education: 45.45 % and Agriculture:
only 1.70%.
Concerning investment budget. the situation is almost the same: 2.35 %in 1977.
0.72% in 1982 and 2.53% in 1984. Between 1978 and 1980 agriculture profited from
a temporary increase: 15.48 % in 1978 and 13.14 % in 1980.
Table 14. Real weight of agricultural scctor in Zaire's state budget (in thousands of Zaires).
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1984
A. Ordinary budgct
Total (a) 847.160 1,161,577 2,391,740 3.850,410 5,964,042 8,453,926 29,328,709
Agriculture (b) 24,042 33,516 40,762 55,175 109,648 167,706 222,531
Relative part of
agriculture 2.83% 2.88% 1.70% 1.43% 1.83% 1.98% 0.76%
(b/a x 100)
B. Investment budgct
Total (a) 110,322 119,680 129,314 246,367 539,711 1,061,073 851,430
Agriculture (b) 2,544 18,523 11,876 32,377 19,582 7,620 21,500
Relative part of
agriculture 2.35% 15.48% 9.18% 13.14% 3.63% 0.72% 2.53%
(b/ax 100)
Source: Banque du Zaire, 1985: 154, 158.
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Table 15. Relative weight of agricultural seelor in the credit conceded by commercial banks and
specialized institutions (in thousands of Zaires).
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agriculture (btax 100) 12.5% 6.1 % 4.5% 2.9% 4.5%
Source: Dcpartement du Plan, 1978: 21, 28; Banque du Zaire, 1985: 264, 270,272.
The increase of agricultural output and productivity can happen only when the
producers have sufficient agricultural inputs. But in Zaire. financial resources devoted
to agriculture have been so little that we cannot expect the improvement of agricul-
tural production or productivity. Indeed, there is only stagnation, even regression of
agricultural production as it is the case now.
This situation shows the wide gap between the importance given to agriculture by
the Zairian government rhetoric and the real facts. Besides. financial institutions have
not supported enough the agricultural sector.
Table 15 gives the evolution of agricultural credit conceded by commercial banks
and specialized financial institutions. Zaire's banking system is composed of three
components: The national bank which achieves the governmental monetary policy,
commercial banks \vhich collect savings and consent short term credit. and specialized
institutions whose main field concerns housing loans. industrial loans, agricultural
loans and underpriviledged savings.
Zaire has more than 10 commercial banks (BCZ: Banque Commerciale Zairoise;
BK: Banque de Kinshasa: UZB: Union Za'iroise de Banques; BOP: Banque du
Peuple. etc.). These banks carry out diverse activities, but their contribution to the
agricultural sector has been modest: Agricultural credit has represented less than
15 %of total credit given by these banks between 1970 and 1986. The main specialized
financial institutions are SOFIDE (Societe Financiere de Developpement), BCA
(Banque de Credit Agricole) and CADEZA (Caisse Generale d'Epargne du Za'ire).
Their contribution to agriculture has also been weak: Average of less than 10 %.
Moreover. this meagre agricultural credit is exclusively devoted to the modern
sector (plantation and agri-business) which possesses requested repayment guarantees.
Thus peasants' agriculture has been completely ignored by commercial banks and
specialized financial institutions. Even the BCA created in 1982 to promote the agri-
cultural sector deals exclusively with the modern sector. especially with traders who
buy products from peasants and exploit them through very low agricultural prices.
This institution, like other financial institutions. requests mortgage and repayment
guarantees for its loans. Because peasants have nothing to mortgage. they are excluded
from this system which is conceived for large-scale farms.
Sometimes, peasants can receive credit in kind (e.g. improved seeds, fertilizers)
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from public institutions such as PNM (Programme National Mai's). PNR (Programme
National Riz) and INERA. But the prices of these inputs are so high that peasants.
after harvesting, have to give most of their produce as debt repayment. This happens
because these costly inputs do not produce proportionally additional production in
order to ease reimbursement and also because of excessive deductions (in kind or in
cash) exerted by lender institutions. Somctimes extension workers must resort to
physical constrains against insolvent peasants and arc then discredited.
11' risks involved in any innovation have to be taken entirely by peasants, they
would not be willing to experiment with new techniques or to accept innovations
from extension \vorkers. Farmers in other countries are willing to adopt new tech-
niques and they experiment with them enthusiastically. because in case of failure.
insurance system, banking credit. cooperatives. etc. will make up for that risk. In
many cases, failure for African peasants may mean starvation. even death. because
they have no support from the government or private financial institutions.
In this case, it is easy to understand peasants' logic when they prefer to continue
traditional cultivation, and then secure their life. rather than to experiment with new
techniques even if they may earn more money. Their choice. in this case. is clear and
rational: Security instead of probable profit maximization. Besides. the fact that most
beneficiaries of agricultural credit are living in Kinshasa and other cities induces the
belief that only a small part of this credit, originally insufficient. reaches really rural
areas: Indeed. concession of credit in Zaire relies more on social rank and links with
influential politicians than on real needs to improve farming activities. Then. large
part of agricultural loans is utilized in urban cities in speculative activities which have
nothing to do with their original destination.
4. Absence of an Adequate Agricultural Policy
Another obstacle to agricultural de\'elopment which has been slightly recognized
by the Zaire's state concerns the absence of an adequate policy in this sector. I con-
form this analysis to the dcfinition which considers agricultural policy as a bundle of
measurcs in favour of agriculture in order to reach objectives previously formulated
for a period of time (3. 5: 10 years) (DADR, 1987),
African countries, especially Zaire. suffer from the absence of economic planning
and then. most of their accomplishments in this field seem to be the result of isolated.
improvised projects without links between them. This is the general situation of the
agricultural sector which is not wcll integrated into the national economy. Dualistic
structure which characterize Zaire's agriculture is a consequence of this lack of an
integratcd policy.
Since 1968, agriculture has been qualified in governmcnt's rhetoric as "priority of
priorities". Zairian governmcnt has defined some objectives and has undertaken
diverse actions to achieve them. The government's agricultural objectives to cope
with the chronic crisis which has characterized this sector for a long time can be
summarized as follows:
(1) National self-sufficiency in food production,
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(2) Regular supply of national industries with local agricultural raw materials,
(3) Maximization of export returns from the agricultural sector.
(4) Improvement of the peasants' welfare in rural areas.
Different governmental documents have emphasized these objectives from 1968
to now. In order to reach these objectives, the Zairian government has taken several
measures which I summarize as follows:
(I) About national food self-sufficiency:
-The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development should improve the forma-
tion of its technicians and popularizers.
-Some offices were created (e.g. Programme National Mais, Programme National
Riz. Programme National Manioc) to palliate the inefficiency of formal agricul-
tural research led by INERA.
-Tn the same way. the Zairian government adopted the World Bank strategy of
"integrated agricultural development" which attempts to introduce a "technologi-
cal packagc" (i.e. fertilizers, improved seeds. equipments) among small-scale
farmers.
-The Zairian government also relies upon Protestant and Catholic missionaries
to introduce appropriate technology, animal-drawl1 cultivation and cooperatives
in rural areas.
(2) Concerning cash crops and large-scale farming, the Zairian government has
decided:
-To increase financial facilities by creating the BCA (Banque de Credit Agricole)
and improvement of SOFIDE (Societe Financiere de Developpement) interven-
tions in this sector.
-To allow the repatriation of profit undertaken by foreign investors.
-To concede important fiscal exonerations for the benefit of agri-business.
(3) For the peasants' welfare in rural areas. it was decided to liberalize agricultural
prices in order to increase producers' purchasing power.
Above, I have just noted the government's objectives concerning the agricultural
sector and its strategies to achieve them. It wiII be interesting now to confront concrete
results of these objectives in order to appreciate the success or failure of Zairian
agricultural policy.
Achievements of the Zairian economy in the agricultural sector these late years
have becn far below the expectations. About food self-sufficiency. concrete achieve-
ments show that this objective has not been reached: Zaire continues to rely upon food
importations. In 1958 Zaire had almost reached food self-sufficiency (food importa-
tions represented only 1% of Zairian total food consumption). But aftcr then the
country imported more than 40% of its food consumption (1966: 42.9%: 1974:
40.2 %). Recent data (Kestin, 1985) shows that Zaire imported 60 % of its national
food requirements in 1985. Then, Zaire still continues to rely upon massive importa-
tions of basic food products such as maize, rice. meat and fish. (Table 16).
Importations of maize have been more important than commercial production in
1978 and 1979. They represented 78 %of the national production in 1980. The situa-
tion is almost the same for other products (meat. rice. fish). Food imports do not
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Table 16. Importations and estimation of commercial production for foodstuO·s.





Cassava 785.0 808.5 832.8 857.8 883.5 910.0 937.3
Tubercls 90.0 92.7 95.5 98.4 101.4 104.4 107.5
Banana 440.0 453.2 466.8 480.8 495.2 510.0 523.3
Maize 125.0 128.0 131.8 142.7 147.0 151.4 155.9
Rice 127.0 130.8 134.7 140.4 144.6 148.9 153.4
Beans 65.0 67.0 69.0 71.1 73.2 75.4 77.7
Fresh fish 75.0 77.3 79.6 81.2 83.6 56.1 57.8
Meat 41.0 42.2 43.5 44.4 45.7 47.1 48.5
Fruits & vegetables 110.0 113.0 116.4 119.9 123.5 127.2 131.0
Importations
Maize 139.1 150.0 102.8 29.6 28.7 9.4 15.1
Rice 29.8 15.6 3.5 13.2 3.0 27.6 26.4
Potatoes 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.03 0.3
Fish 7.5 5.7 1.6 9.0 4.2 9.5 12.9
Meat 13.9 6.0 7.4 5.0 3.6 10.9 23.4
Wheat 94.9 146.4 163.5 157.4 145.2 95.2 45.0
Source: Banque du Zaire, 1985: 91.
increase because of lack of foreign currency and poor per capita revenue. The gap
between national requirements and food availability (production and importation)
shows the actual situation of Zairian agriculture about self-sufficiency.
We can also notice that the commercial balance of agricultural commodities has
often been negative in Zaire: in 1974. for instance. Zaire imported food for 92.7 million
of Zaires. while the export returns from the agricultural sector were only 82.7 million
or a deficit of 10 million of Zaires. In spite of these massive food importations. na-
tional requirements are not fulfilled. For instance. the large meat deficit illustrates the
wide gap between food availability and national requirements (Table 17). The defi-
cit is increasing year by year: 598,309 tons in 1971 and 666.603 tons in 1975. which
shows that the daily availability of food remains largely below the population re-
quirements. Recent data (Table 18) shows that Zaire has become self-sufficient only
for cassava among the three most consumed foodstuffs (cassava. maize and rice).
The situation is the worst for meat and fish (respectively 4.18 kg/year and 4 kg/year
as an average consumption while FAO norms are 25 kg for meat and 21 kg for fIsh).
Between 1971 and 1980, the annual growth rate was 2.60 for food production and
importation against 2.87 %for population increase.
Tahle 17. Estimation of meat requirements, availability, and deficit of proteins.
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1979 Cassava 12,430 11,264 +1,166
Rice 221 360 -139
Maize 537 743 -206
Cassava 12,784 11,616 +1,168
Rice 233 371 -138
Maize 562 768 -206
Cassava 13,172 11,986 +1.186
Rice 245 382 -137
Maize 639 794 -155
Source: DADR, 1987: 18.
Table 19. Cotton requirements for nalionallcxliJe industry per year.
Cotton-mills Requirements (M.T.) Relative parl (Yo)
1. UTEXCO 10,000 47.0
2. SOTEXKI 3,500 16.5
3. FILTIZAF 3.300 15.5
4. SOLBENA 1,800 8.5
5. AMATO 1,440 6.8
6. ZAITEX 1,020 4.8
7. Olhers 180 0.8
TOlal ~~~~~~2c-I-',2:-4""'0~~~~~--~1-'-0-0.-0~~-
Source: Makanda. 1980: 332.
The second government objective concerns the regular supply of national industries
with agricultural raw materials. Concrete achievements prove also that results are
far below expectations. The case of textile industries (Table 19) well illustrates this
situation: While national industries need 21,240 T per year. peasants produced only
9.741 Tin 1980 (Banque du ZaIre. 1984). Then, 11.499 T should be imported to fulfill
this deficit. The situation is almost the same for other products such as oil palm and
sugar-cane.
Concerning the maximization of export earnings from the agricultural sector, the
real situation shows that the agricultural part still continues to decrease. While the
average contribution of this sector was 40% before 1960. nowadays it fluctuates
between 20.2% (1976) and 9% (1982). In governmental policy. the mining sector
takes priority over agriculture and generates about 80 %of total export returns. Then
investments are almost exclusively oriented towards the mining industry.
The last objective concerns the improvement of the peasants' standard of living.
The deep impoverishment of rural areas proves to be contrary to governmental ob-
jectives. The peasants' impoverishment is a direct consequence of the deterioration
of their purchasing power. The large gap between prices paid to producers and prices
of manufactured goods cannot allow peasants to improve their welfare as was in-
tended to in otlicial declarations. Further. I will analyze in detail how the commercial
bourgeoisie has accumulated his wealth by exploiting peasants and has prevented
them from investing and producing more than self-sufficiency.
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5. Inadequacy of Public Institutions Involved in Agricultural Development
Official documents have always recognized the lack of coordination between multi-
ple public institutions in charge of the agricultural sector as an important factor of
agricultural regression in Zaire. Indeed. institutions which define and control agricul-
tural policy in Zaire almost act independently of each other. Their dispersed interven-
tions do not obey an integrated programme. These insulated projects, executed in
extended order, have not produced expected effects. In many cases they negatively
compete instead of benefiting from economies of scale.
For instance, national agricultural objectives have been defined sometimes by the
Ministry of Agriculture (Programme Agricole Minimum 1980), by the Ministry of
Planning (Programme de Relance Agricole 1978-1980). and sometimes by the head
ofilce of the President of Zaire (Plan Mobutu). Important factors which condition
agricultural development completely escape the supervision of the Ministry of Agri-
culture: The maintenance of the road network is committed to a public institution
(Oflke des Routes) which depends on the Ministry of Construction and to local
administrative entities (colJectivites locales) controlled by the Home Ofilce.
Besides, the minimum olTIcial prices of the agricultural products are fixed by the
Ministry of National Economy. Once. the Ministry of Agriculture protested against
this system, saying that "fixed prices which must be considered as minimum prices
are however considered as maximum prices. The fixation of these prices does not
rely on the analysis of different elements which determine the net cost" (DADR,
1982: 3).
We can also notice the contradiction between development objectives defined by
different public institutions. For instance, one of the objectives pursued by the Minis-
try of Agriculture is the maximization of export-earnings from agriculture, while the
Ministry of National Economy is pursuing the maximization of fiscal returns to
cover the public financial deficit. This situation has resulted in the increase of taxes
charged on agricultural exports (e.g. taxe conjoncturelJe temporaire, taxe statistique).
This confusion also exists about the agricultural educational system supervised by
the Ministry of Education without any coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture
concerning the contents of programmes, real requirements of rural regions, research
priorities, etc. Because the Ministry of Agriculture is the largest employer of agricul-
tural technicians in rural regions, it is quite right that this institution should also in-
dicate which kind of technicians are requested according to real requirements and
experiences of rural areas.
Besides, the instability of the structure of INERA, the only agricultural research
centre in Zaire, which sometimes depends on the Minsitry of Agriculture. Ministry of
Scientific Research and sometimes on the Office of Zaire's President. illustrates also
the confusion reigning among different institutions involved in agricultural develop-
ment projects.
Thus, concerning either the conception of agricultural policy. or about specific
problems such as agricultural research. education, prices and transportation in-
frastructure, different public institutions involved in this sector do not have an in-
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tegrated strategy and sometimes pursue objectives diametrically opposed. There is not
a central organ to coordinate different actions into one integrated whole in the agri-
cultural sector. The Ministry of Agricultural has already raised this issue: Any co-
ordination among different ministries which intervene in agricultural policy has not
been assured and it results in the mismanagement of resources. equipments and
manpower (DADR. 1982). The analysis above has clearly shown which of the Zaire's
agricultural problems arc explicitly accepted by Zairian official institutions.
The Ministry of Agriculture (DADR. 1982) has suggested solutions to the agri-
cultural crisis in the following terms: Concerning peasants' agriculture, remunerative
prices should be proposed to incite the production of commercial surplus and to
break off the self-sufficient economy. This requires an appropriate commercial system
and convenient transportation networks. Peasants must have opportunities for access
to agricultural inputs (e.g. fertilizers. weed-killing tools, insect-killing) and purchasing
manufactured commodities. This strategy should also stress possibilities of providing
new techniques easily in rural areas in order to increase agricultural productivity.
Because these conditions have never been completely fulfilled during the last 20 years.
peasants' productivity is steadily decreasing and has compromized urban food supply.
The government is, then. constrained to import costly food to cover national require-
ments. particularly to supply big cities.
Concerning the modern sector. the Ministry of Agriculture has estimated that
ranches and large-scale farms have suffered important losses from the nationalization
of foreigners' assets in 1973. Its current difficult situation is due to mainly the lack of
foreign currency to import raw materials and equipments. An official explanation of
the agricultural crisis and a proposed strategy to deal with this crisis seem to be clearly
expressed. However. we must ask ourselves why agriculture still continues to be
neglected in spite of political declarations which have recognized the strategic im-
portance of this sector and what are the causes of its collapse. In other words. are the
official explanations enough to understand the actual crisis?
Of course. problems such as transportation infrastructure. agricultural research, an
inappropriate educational system and lack of financial means arc real and cannot be
minimized. However. the current agricultural crisis is not a result of these isolated
causes. but of their cumulative and mutual efrects. The main explanation of agricul-
tural collapse lies on political ground due to the nature of the present Zairian state
which is used as an instrument of wealth accumulation and domination by politicians,
themselves businessmen.
NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE AND AGRICULTURAL CRISIS IN ZAIRE
The causes of the agricultural crisis. agricultural degeneration and perpetuation
mechanisms are better understood only if \\e consider motives which have led the
Zairian state. since the independence. to deliberately neglect the agricultural sector.
especially to act against peasants' interests. Contemporary orientation of economic
policy which has plunged agriculture into unprecedented depression can be under-
stood only if we integrate. in our analysis. the situation of a minority ruling class
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which has been in power since the independence. The personal interests of the political
and commercial bourgeoisie, its reactions in the face of an agricultural crisis and its
responsibilities as a ruling class must be the main component of the analysis. if we
really want to understand relationships between peasants and Zairian state and why
government's rhetoric for almost 30 years has not produced any positive results for
peasants.
Indeed, we can notice that official argument about the agricultural crisis in Zaire.
up to now, has carefully eliminated any reference to the responsibility of the national
bourgeoisie. The reason is that the ruling class in power which finances and controls
the research network cannot allow any allusion to its role as the dominant social
group. Except few scientists such as Kankwenda (1983). Peemans (1980) and
Longandjo (1985) analysis of Zairian crisis. conducted under the supervision of the
ruling bourgeoisie. has limited itself to the apparent causes and has wittingly been
unable to explain why agriculture is facing a structural crisis since the independence.
During the colonial era, Zairian agriculture was assigned double objectives: To
supply manpower to the mining sector, transportation infrastructure and to the in-
dustry. and at the same time to feed at cheap prices urban populations. These ob-
jectives could be reached efficiently by means of the strong physical constraints ex-
erted by colonial administration which also prevented population migrations from
rural regions to cities.
Since 1960, as agriculture has failed to supply sufficient food to urban centres,
they had to rely mostly on importations. especially for fish, meat and rice. while a
rural exodus is almost impossible to stop. The current weakness of the administrative
apparatus has resulted in a high level of despotism and corruption, which has eventu-
ally contributed to the disorganization of the agricultural sector and unprecedented
rate of rural exodus.
To solve the crisis. or rather to "manage" it as once said by Kankwenda (1983).
the ruling class has decided to resort to palliative solutions which exclude peasants.
For instance. the model of "development agreements" (conventions de d6veloppe-
ment) which requests industries to produce themselves agricultural raw materials
they need (especially breweries and tobacco producers) or to provide food for their
manpower (the case of Gecamines, the biggest mining firm in Zaire) in order to avoid
expensive maize importations. This formula has permitted some capitalist firms to
produce food as shown in Table 20.
Table 20. Production and previsions of maize.
Firms 1979 1980 \98\ 1982 1983 1984
(M.T.)
I. Renaut-Zaire
Kinshasa 300 1,500 2,000 2,000
2. Cccamines
CEPSE Likasi 10,500 14,200 20,000 30.000 35,000 45,000
Kamina Kasese 5,400 2,600 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000
3. SODIMIZA
Musoshi 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,000 3,000
Total 17,400 18.800 27,800 40,500 47,000 58,000
Source: DADR, 1982: 36.
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[t means that the Zairian state prefers capitalist firms to peasant agriculture to
solve the agricultural crisis. Then, the available financial means are concentrated on
the modern sector. Concretely, the agricultural plan elaborated by the Ministry or
Agriculture (1984) relied exclusively on capitalist mining societies and large-scale
farms. The agricultura[ projects financed by external resources from foreign countries
(France. Belgium, U.S.A .. Japan. West Germany) and international organizations
(Wor[d Bank. FAO and PNUD) have concerned oil palm products (Equateur), colton
and sugar-cane (Bas-Zaire). The only result of these kinds of projects was to enlarge
the external debt. while the agricultural output has not sensitively increased. Peasants
who have not benefited from these external financial resources. mostly support the
hard conditions of debt repayment and economic recession.
Concerning these projects financed by foreign countries. van del' Steen (1977)
has noticed that the large-scale projects using tractors and sophisticated material
which request the intervention of high qualified foreign technicians. almost retain the
attention of Zairian policy makers. But the real cost of these projects is artificially
decreased by state subsidies or foreign aid. When these subsidies and foreign aid end.
the project cannot continue by itself and it collapses.
This policy confirm the assertion of Boutrais (1982) about the agricultural policy
in Africa. of which he described as "an agriculture without peasants". It also illus-
trates the exclusion of peasants from the process of agricu[tutal development for the
benefit of industrial and commercial capitalism. Indeed. the commercial bourgeoisie
has actually a vested interest in the commerce of peasants' production and acquires
scandalous profits. to the prejudice of the producers. by buying at very low prices and
selling at very high prices in the urban markets. We can now understand the meaning
of the liberalization of agricultural prices in Zaire. It is just a way to reduce the
agriculture to its current role: To enrich a parasitical urban bourgeoisie.
Generally. peasants sell their product to and receive loans from the same middle-
man. They are then exploited in these two ways by means of low agricultural prices
and prohibitive loan interests. Commercial relationships between peasants and
traders in rural areas have been characterized by agricultural [ow prices coupled with
very high prices of manufactured goods.
Figure 3 and Table 2[ show the gap between official minimum prices which are not
respected by monopolistic traders. the very low prices really paid to peasants, and the
fabulous profit margin taken by the commercial bourgeoisie. Figure 3 shows suf-
ficiently how scandalous the peasants' exploitation is for the benefit of the commercial
bourgeoisie. Official agricultural prices. already low compared to prices of manu-
factured commodities paid by peasants. are not even respected by the monopolistic
traders who also receive excessive returns from urban consumers.
The fabulous profit margin taken by the commercial bourgeoisie cannot be ex-
p[ained only by the degradation of the transportation infrastructure. We must con-
sider the fact that prices are fixed by the Ministry of National Economy and by the
association of Zairian businessmen, ANEZA (Association Nationa[e des Enterprises
du Zai're). The peasants' interests are not represented in this process. The peasants'
situation is worsened by "sky-rocket" inflation rates: The average index of retail
prices has passed from 100 in [970 to 18,519 in 1984 (Garnela et aI.. 1986).
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Fig.3. Evolution of the maize prices from 1975 to 1981 (Source: Gamela et al.. 1987: 57).
Table 21. Prices of Zairian main foodstuffs (cassava, maize and rice) (1975 = 100).
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
(Z/kg)
Cassava
State minimum prices 0.020 500 500 1100 1750 2500 3250
Prices on rural market 0.020 265 160 245 190 185 180
Prices 011 Kinshasa
market 0.290 165 320 544 979 1079 1293 2344
Maize
State minimum prices 0.070 171 171 314 500 714 928
Prices on rural market 0.070 90 56 70 54 53 51
Prices on Kinshasa
market 0.770 119 169 235 462 505 796 1146
Rice
State minimum prices 0.080 150 150 200 625 875 962
Prices on rural market 0.080 79 49 44 69 65 53
Prices on Kinshasa market 0.540 40 163 337 818 1039 2030 2839
Source: Gamela et aI., 1987: 42.
These "sky-high" prices in the market have nothing to do with the evolution of
per capita revenue. Then, the standard of living has dramatically gone down both in
urban centres and in rural areas as shown in Figure 4.
While prices of the agricultural products in rural areas have been kept at a very low
level. urban consumers are requested to pay colossal amounts of money for the same
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Fig. 4. Evolution of minimum legal salary, real income and average index of retail prices (1970 =
100) (Source: Banque du Zaire, 1985: 65).
products. Verhaegen (1973) has estimated that the prices of agricultural products
such as cassava, maize, peanuts and oil palm paid by the consumer were 3-10 times
higher than prices received by producers. Especially prices of vegetables from North
Kivu and sold in the Kinshasa market were 30-40 times higher than peasants' prices.
As we can notice. peasants and urban consumers are victims of the prices practised
by the commercial bourgeoisie who is the only beneficiary. Why has not the Zairian
government attempted to change this situation? Tndeed. we must remember that the
political bourgoisie which has ruled the country since 1960 does not have a self-
sufficient economic base to support its domination and to reinforce its position as the
intermediary between the local population and international capitalism. This class
depends, for its wealth accumulation. on public resources. As the Zairian govern-
ment. since 1960. has received more than 80% of its resources from thc mining sector,
we understand why the ruling class strives to control this sector.
The control of state resources provides the Zairian political class with economic
benefit in three ways: High salaries. corruption and embezzlement. For instance.
Peemans (1980) has noticed that in 1980. more than 60% of Zaire's ordinary budget
was embezzled and, in 1982. the Zaire's president disclosed also that 50 % of the








Fi!:.5. Social group's relations in Zairian macro-society (Source: Longandjo, 1985: 1).
(1978) has analyzed how the political bourgeoisie. through corruption. accumulates
its wealth in negotiations with foreign countries: This class negotiates all of its services
to either producers, investors, suppliers or even consumers. Especially the political
class finds wealth opportunities when foreign investments. cooperation projects or
equipment supplies are concerned. We can now understand why very expensive, in-
appropriate and needless projects such as the giant dam oflnga, especially the electric
line Inga-Shaba, and the Maluku steel mill (Siderurgie de Maluku) have been ac-
cepted by the ruling class.
This analysis sheds light upon the nationalization measures (Zairianization: 1973.
Radicalization: 1974) which now appear clearly as an attempt to constitute an
economic base for the political bourgeoisie. This class neither had a regular source
of wealth accumulation nor could find it in the financial sector nor in the industry
where the foreign interests were mostly strong. Commerce and agriculture were the
only sectors considered easy to confiscate. The device "economy is in the service of
Zairian people" had sense only for the political and commercial bourgeoisie who
monopolized the nationalized assets.
We can also refer to the analysis of Longandjo (1985) about relations of social
groups in Zaire in order to make clear the responsibilities of the commercial and
political bourgeoisie which utilizes the Zairian state as an instrument of wealth accu-
mulation in the current agricultural crisis (Fig. 5). The commercial bourgeoisie has
control over the means of production (capital) resources and over the employed mass.
This bourgeoisie can also mobilize peasants and unemployed masses for its own
profit.
But this system works successfully on the condition that the State intervenes to
secure the bourgeoisie's interests. Then the main vocation of the state is to mobilize
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materials and human resources for the benefit of the national bourgeoisie and foreign
investors. The state mobilizes the peasants' surplus by fixing very low agricultural
prices which are not even respected by traders (cf. Table 21 and Fig. 3) in order to
insure the commercial bourgeoisie's wealth. Agricultural price levels constitute a
concrete proof of the State's role as an instrument devoted to mobilize local resources,
especially from agriculture. for the benefit of the commercial bourgeoisie.
We can understand. then, why peasants, sometimes. are reluctant to increase their
production and why agriculture faces a serious crisis nowadays. Under these condi-
tions, peasants' interests do not prevail among policy makers. On the contrary. they
are exploited by means of low agricultural prices, compulsory cultivation, etc. for the
benefit of the commercial bourgeoisie. No action has been taken to improve their
situation.
The problem with this kind of "compradore bourgeoisie" is that it is a consumer
bourgeoisie (opposed to the producer bourgeoisie in capitalist developed countries).
This social class has accumulated wealth through corruption, high salaries and
embezzlement of public funds. The capital, then accumulated by thcse means, is most-
ly kept abroad in foreign currency. invested in speculative activities in the country
or purely consumed in ostentatious expenditures.
As this compradore bourgeoisie has been managing the country since the indepen-
dence. it is natural that agriculture should have been neglected for the benefit of the
mining sector which insures the State's revenue and. then. its own wealth. We can
understand why agriculture is "milked" without any concern for its regeneration.
The current agricultural crisis cannot be rightly explained without the compradore
bourgeoisie's context.
Peasants' reactions. in order to face this shameless exploitation, depend on the
possibilities of respective rural regions for access to urban markets or to shift from
agriculture to non-agricultural activities:
-Peasants. when the gap between agricultural prices and other commodities is
largely unfavourable to them. prefer to produce strictly for their own consumption
because profit from commercial surplus is not proportional to the additional effort.
Tlus is particularly the case in remote areas which have few exchanges with urban
centres. As the transportation infrastructure is quasi-inexistent, even traders seldom
communicate with these areas (for instance. the case of Masisi in North Kivu).
-Peasants who can sell their products in good conditions and obtain valuable revenue
are capable to adjust their prices to the evolution of the general index. This is the
case in Regions such as Bas-Zaire and Bandundu which have a good transportation
infrastructure and are well connected to Kinshasa. In these areas peasants are in-
terested in producing more than self-sufficient level and can bargain their com-
modities. However, this can happen only for foodstuffs but not for cash crops.
-In mining regions where diamond and gold can be exploited. agriculture is aban-
doned for the profit of this traffic. Though agricultural prices steadily increase,
young generations do not accept retuming to farm-work and, in many cases,
school attendance is considered a waste of time. This is the case in Regions such
as Kasai (diamond) and Shabunda, Walikala in Kivu (gold).
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Besides, in the face of the declining capacity of the state for development. if not its
negative attitude concerning peasants' agriculture, ordinary people have developed
"survival strategies" (Nzongola et al.. 1986). In rural areas, peasants' reactions con-
sist of a passive resistance or of complete isolation from state institutions and activi-
ties. We can also notice the proliferation of religious groups such as Kitawala or
)\!onama which constitute. in fact. movements of political resistance. For instance,
Kitawala, the millenarian movement existed during the colomal period and was aimed
at removing the colonizers through magic means is still popular in Zaire.
CONCLUSION
The agricultural crisis in Zaire is not an accidental situation but is the result of the
policy defined and executed by the ruling bourgeoisie for the personal interests of this
class. Hence, formal causes of this agricultural crisis, generally accepted by the govern-
ment. only partially explain the actual situation of the agricultural sector and must
be considered as secondary, subordinate causes or aggravating factors. The main
explanation of this crisis, without minimizing perverse effects of problems such as
transportation infrastructure, agricultural research and educational system, consists
in the economic policy followed by the compradore bourgeoisie.
This situation, far from characterizing only Zairian agriculture. is rather common
in many Third World countries. particularly in Africa. We can refer here to the
South American "Latifundia" and feudal land tenure system in some Asian countries.
However, the solution to this agricultural crisis cannot be found without peasants
who represent the main component of agricultural development. Food production
still relies on peasants' agriculture and then, agricultural policy must consider. above
all, the peasants' interests concerning production systems, inputs' availability and
prices.
Consequently, current solutions proposed to solve the crisis (Development Agree-
ments. Rural Integrated Development Scheme) constitute only a palliative which can,
for a short period, mitigate problems of urban food supply and agricultural raw
material. However, they are not appropriate to solve the whole agricultural crisis.
I agree with Kankwenda (I983) when he stipulates that the current policy is not
a solution but rather a way to manage the crisis. Perspectives of Zairian agricultural
development still remain negative, unless the state should be dominated by other
class coalition which gives privileges to the peasants' component.
Concerning international cooperation, Popelier (1977) has suggested. in a popuList
optic. that intensive capitalistic projects should be rapidly abandoned so that the
profit of small-scale peasants who are the only ones to retain the agricultural solution
may be promoted.
In the same way, I think that agricultural cooperatives can be rightly considered
as an instrument of rural development. because they can free peasants from the ex-
ploitation of the commercial bourgeoisie by providing credit, informing them about
official prices below which they cannot accept in order to sell their commodities and
by taking charge of commercial process of farm produce. Then, by maximizing the
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peasants' profit, cooperatives can encourage them to produce more than self-sufficient
economy and elevate their purchasing and bargaining power. In this sense, coopera-
tives can constitute also a pressure group to protect peasants' interest, especially
concerning agricultural prices and access to public financial resources. Cooperatives,
considered from a populist optic. can contribute to an agricultural solution by
introducing appropriate technology in rural regions and by providing adequate
education for their members.
But this scheme can rightly work only if the state is dominated by a pro-rural,
pro-peasants' coalition. It goes without saying that the success of rural development
policy can be assured only by a strong mobilization of the mass of peasants freed
from exploitation and given opportunities to participate actively in the preparation.
implementation and supervision of national economic policy. Once more. this can
be achieved only through peasants' organizations such as cooperative institutions.
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